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ONE YEAR REVIEW OF TORTS
By WILLSON HURT*

The past year brought to the Supreme Court of Colorado a
flood of over 70 cases involving some feature of tort law. Many important decisions were handed down. Those cases that appear of
greatest interest to the legal profession have been digested here
and, at times, commented upon. Some cases, in which existing law
was simply reaffirmed, have been omitted.
I. WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION

In Lamirato v. 0. C. Kinney, Inc.," plaintiffs, the surviving dependents of a deceased employee of defendant, filed claim for death
benefits under the Workmen's Compensation Act. 2 A referee of the
Industrial Commission entered findings and an order, which were
adopted by the Commission as its own, denying the claim. The
referee found that the deceased employee, who died as a result of
a massive subarachnoid hemorrhage, was not subjected to any overexertion in the course of his work, because at the time of his attack
he was performing the normal duties of his trade as a sheet metal
worker, and that his death was not the result of accidental injury
arising out of and in the course of employment within the meaning of the act. Medical testimony indicated that a subarachnoid
hemorrhage results from a prenatal defect of the arteries in a region
of the brain and that an attack could come at any age or not at all.
Such testimony also indicated that an attack frequently occurs in
the case of athletes during periods of maximum exertion, since such
over-exertion can cause a subarachnoid hemorrhage. The Supreme
Court affirmed, refusing to upset the findings of the Commission, as
it was supported by the record before the Commission.'
The ruling seems to be a proper one because the plaintiff, in
making his record, failed to show any over-exertion that could be
considered as accidental.
State Compensation Ins. Fund v. Walter4 involved the ever
recurrent question of whether the employee at the time of the accident was injured in the course of his employment. The claimant
was employed by the University of Colorado and was assigned
parking space in a parking lot maintained by the University on its
property and reserved for its employees. Upon finishing the day's
work in the stadium shop, the claimant, in crossing a public street
to get to the parking lot, had to jump a ditch, which had been excavated along the side of the roadway. In so doing, he injured his
ankle. The Industrial Commission awarded compensation to the
claimant on the ground that he was injured in the course of his
employment. The' Supreme Court affirmed the award. The court
*Associate Professor of tow, University of Denver Law Center.
1 349 P.2d 562 (Colo. 1960).
2 Colo. Rev. Stat. § 81-1-1 (1953).
3 Said the court, with a shrug, at 565: "Under the oft-repeated rule, so familiar that the citation
of authorities is now considered surplusage, !he finding of the Commission, being supported by the
record, will not be disturbed on review."
4 354 P.2d 591 (Colo. 1960).
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considered some of its prior decisions and cases from other jurisdictions. It concluded that, although there is a conflict in the cases, the
better rule allows recovery.
Marotte v. State Compensation Ins. Fund,5 involved injury
caused by a heart attack (diagnosed as a myocardial infarction).
The claimant, a police officer of the City and County of Denver,
was in a minor traffic accident while performing his duties as a
traffic officer. As to whether the claimant's chest hit the steering
wheel was somewhat doubtful, but the claimant said that thereafter
for several days he felt "bad," had headaches and was very shortwinded. While in this condition, he was sent on an official call to a
Denver address to kill a snake. He finally located the snake, found
a club "and chased it around a bit" and killed it. Next he went to
the police pistol range to practice, and shortly afterwards that afternoon he suffered a heart attack. The claimant was 45 years old.
Medical testimony by a heart specialist indicated that the trauma
from the steering wheel-or even if there had been no blow, the
emotional upset accompanying the auto accident-plus the snake
killing episode, and his examination of claimant, made the doctor
of the opinion that it was probable that there was a causative relationship between such episodes and the development of the myocardial infarction. The claimant's claim was denied by the Industrial Commission, which was affirmed on review by the district
court. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded the cause to the
commission with instructions to enter an award in accordance with
the medical testimony. The court relied mainly on a decision it rendered in 1957.6
II.

COMMON CARRIERS

In Denver-Albuquerque Motor Transp., Inc. v. Galligan7 plaintiff, a shipper of meat by defendant common carrier's motor freight
line, sued for damages caused by the alleged negligent delay in the
delivery of the meat by defendant carrier. The Supreme Court reaffirmed one of its earlier holdings" to the effect that when the shipper makes a prima facie case of undue delay, the burden then rests
upon the carrier to show that the injuries causing damages resulted
either from an act for which it was not responsible, or a cause from
which it had legally exempted itself by contract.
III. ANIMALS

In the case of Robinson v. Kerr,9 plaintiff, a boy 7 years of age,
was blinded in one eye by the kick of the defendant's horse which
had trespassed onto his grandfather's land. The horse came through
a "gate" that consisted of one strand of barbed wire. The boy, with
the grandfather's encouragement, was trying to drive the horse off
the land when the injury occurred.
5 357 P.2d 915 (Colo. 1960).
6 Industrial Comm'n v. Havens, 136 Colo. 111, 314 P.2d 698 (1957). As to the Havens case, the
court said at 916: "We further there held that in the absence of evidence to rebut a prima facie
showing that the heart attack had occurred while employed that it must be held that the claimant
was entitled to compensation."
7 358 P.2d 28 (Colo. 1960).
8 Estes v. Denver & Rio Grande R. R. Co., 49 Colo. 378, 113 Poc. 1005 (1911).
9 355 P.2d 117 (Colo. 1960).
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The child brought action against the owner of the horse and at
the conclusion of plaintiff's evidence, defendant moved for a directed
verdict on the ground that the grandfather had not fenced livestock
out in accordance with the "fence law." 10 The trial court granted
the motion. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded, on the
ground that Morris v. Fraker,1 the leading case in this state, although it serves as a guide for crop owners and cattlemen, has no
application to an action for personal injuries caused by livestock
trespassing on the land of others. The court pointed out that the
"fence law" itself limits its application to "damages for trespass and
12
injury to grass, garden, or vegetable products or other crops.'
This being true, the defendant was responsible for its horse's breaking the close of the grandfather and kicking the plaintiff. It is to be
noted that it was agreed before trial that the issue of the propensities of the horse, whether vicious or gentle, would be dispensed
with. The stipulation, then, precluded the consideration of the law
of strict liability for domestic animals with known vicious propensities but left in the law of trespass quare clausum fregit. This case
reaches a sensible result in a state that is slowly progressing from
the open range economics of an older era. The court properly confines the fence law to its historic and economic purpose.
In Swerdfeger v. Krueger,13 plaintiff, an 11 year old boy of more
than average intelligence, sued defendant for having been bitten by
the latter's Malemute Husky dog, which was securely chained in the
defendant's backyard. The yard was not fenced, but had a row of
lilac bushes along the property line. The plaintiff was warned by
his young companions not to approach the dog, that the dog was
vicious and might bite, and that one of his companions had been
bitten by the dog previously. Plaintiff stated that "he knew dogs
and was not afraid of them." He entered the yard between the lilac
bushes, approached the dog, and was bitten. The defendant owner
knew that the dog was vicious. The jury rendered a verdict for
plaintiff and judgment was entered thereon. The Supreme Court,
by a five to two decision, reversed and remanded with instructions
to vacate the judgment and dismiss the action. The court considered that the plaintiff was an intelligent boy of 11, who was well
aware of the danger in trespassing on the defendant's land in a
10 Colo. Rev. Stat. § 8-13-1 (1953).
11 5 Colo. 425 (1880).
12 Colo. Rev. Stat. § 8-13-2 (1953).
13 358 P.2d 479 (Colo. 1960).
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sheer act of recklessness or bravado, and that he should be
4 responsible for the consequences of the known risk he assumed.1
In the dissent, it is pointed out that the jury had properly been
presented with the consideration of contributory negligence and assumption of risk, and it had decided for the plaintiff. The dissent
argues that the verdict should have settled the matter. But should
it? Should the jury have been permitted to say that the plaintiff
did not assume the risk? If the jury is allowed to make such a finding, can it be said that the finding has remained within the bounds
of reason?
Next, the dissent reasons that the dog was in the nature of a
dangerous spring gun-a trap for the unwary. 15 We submit the
analogy is weak. In the spring gun case the gun was intended to
repel a trespasser; in the instant case the dog was not trained as a
watch dog, but as a pet of defendant's children.
IV.

INTENTIONAL OR NEGLIGENT INFLICTION OF MENTAL DISTURBANCE

In Spomer v. City of Grand Junction,16 the parents of a deceased
child bought a burial lot from the defendant city in its municipal
cemetery for the burial of their child who had been killed in an accident. The parents brought action against the city and the city
manager. The parents' evidence tended to prove: that the caretaker
of the cemetery had informed the deceased child's mother that the
child's grave was in the wrong location and that prior vendees of
the lot desired that the child's body be removed from it; that the
caretaker later stated that the child's remains had to be removed
either with or without the parents' consent, which consent the parents refused; that sometime later the parents discovered that the
child's body had been moved to another grave; and that the city
manager had ordered the removal. At the conclusion of the plaintiffs' principal case, the city and the city manager moved for a directed verdict on the ground, among others,- that plaintiffs were
claiming damages for mental pain and suffering, which could not
be allowed unless plaintiffs proved wilful and wanton conduct on
the part of defendants, and plaintiffs failed to prove any such conduct by defendants. The trial court granted the motion. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded, saying that there was sufficient evidence of wilful and wanton conduct to warrant the submission of the cause to the jury.
As to the immunity of the city, the court stated that the city
was engaged in a proprietary rather than a governmental function
in the operation of the cemetery, 17 and that its liability for tort
while so engaged was the same as that of a private corporation. As
to the immunity of the city manager, the court stated that he was
acting as an agent of the city and in so doing he had the status of
an agent of an ordinary corporation and was not immune from suit.
14 For
15 The
But there
16 355
17 For

this proposition the court cited the Restatement, Torts, § 339 (e).
dissent cites the well-known case of Starkey v. Daneron, 92 Colo. 420, 21 P.2d 112 (1933).
was nothing in the Starkey case to show that the plaintiff was aware of the risk.
P.2d 960 (Colo. 1960).
this, the court cited Town of Eaton v. Bouslog, 133 Colo. 130, 292 P.2d 343 (19561.
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V.

WRONGFUL DEATH

In Espinoza v. Gurule,18 plaintiffs, parents of decedent, a boy
16 years of age at the time of his death, filed their complaint against
defendant, claiming under the wrongful death statute. 19 Later the
plaintiffs amended their complaint, omitting any claim for damage
for compensation because of the death, but claiming that the defendant wrongfully killed the decedent, and by reason thereof the
plaintiffs had incurred funeral expenses in a specified amount. The
defendant filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that plaintiffs'
alleged claim was barred by the two year statute of limitations of
the wrongful death statute. 20 The trial court sustained the motion
and dismissed the complaint. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded with directions to reinstate the amended complaint. The
court stated that there is no doubt that funeral expenses are recoverable as damages in actions brought under the wrongful death
statute,21 but that the remedy there provided is not necessarily exclusive. The court pointed out that recovery of funeral expenses
by a deceased's personal representative in an independent action
has been approved.22 The court then held that funeral expenses may
be recovered by the parents of a deceased child in an action independent of the wrongful death statute. The court pointed out that
by statute 23 the expenses of the family are chargeable upon the
property of both husband and wife, or either of them; and, if the
defendant negligently caused the decedent's death, the defendant
imposed upon the plaintiffs an obligation for which the defendant
should pay.
VI.

DEFAMATION-

RIGHT OF PRIVACY

24

In O'Cand v. Espinosa, it was held that the defendant's spoken
words in the presence of witnesses, "You are thieves," referring to
plaintiffs, were slanderous per se.
In Knowlton v. Cervi,25 the plaintiff's original complaint was
to recover damages for an alleged libel. The amended complaint
combined the claim of libel with the claim that plaintiff's constitutional rights had been violated, in that his right to live a "quiet,
peaceful and unsullied" life and enjoy an "unblemished reputation"
had been invaded and that his character had been "ruthlessly and
needlessly invaded." A motion to dismiss both claims was sustained
by the trial court. The Supreme Court affirmed. The facts are
stated in its opinion as follows:
The record discloses that on or about May 2, 1957 defendants published in Cervi's Journal an article headed
"Suburbanite charges Policeman said: 'You live outside of
Denver, Have No Rights, Shut up or Go To Jail.'" Then
follows the statement: "A Denver traffic policeman was
accused this week of telling off a suburban dweller, a Den18356 P.2d 891 (Colo. 1960).
19 Colo. Rev. Stat. . 41-1-1 (1953).
20 Colo. Rev. Stat.
41-1-4 (1953).
21 Citing Dillon v. Sterling Works, 106 Colo. 407, 106 P.2d 358 (1940), and Tadlock v. Lloyd, 65
Colo. 40, 173 Pac. 200 (1918).
22 Citing, among other cases, Kling v. Phayer, 130 Colo. 158, 274 P.2d 97, 98 (1954).
23 Colo. Rev. Stat. § 43.1-10 (1953).
24 347 P.2d 1118 (Colo. 1960).
25 350 P.2d 1066 (Colo. 1960).
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ver manufacturer of storm windows as follows: 'You don't
have any rights in Denver, you deserve a ticket, you live
outside the city and don't pay taxes, and if you say one
more word, I'm taking you to jail.'" Then follows copy of
the letter which the article said was sent to Governor McNichols and other top officials,
and to Denver and suburban
26
newspapers, by the motorist.
This letter contained the quoted matter above set forth. The Supreme Court first held that the article in the paper was not libelous.
Then the court went on to say that the publication merely published
what plaintiff reportedly said to a motorist, and the court inferred
that the plaintiff police officer, by his "reportedly" provocative
words, brought the unfavorable publicity upon himself.
Perhaps the plaintiff did have a weak case for the violation of
his right of privacy, but it seems to us that the Colorado Supreme
Court once again sidesteps the question whether the right of privacy, "the right to be let alone," exists in this state.

VII.

DUTY OF OCCUPIERS OF LAND

In Bailey v. King Soopers, Inc., 27 the plaintiff slipped on ice and
fell in the defendant's parking lot near its market. At the conclusion of plaintiff's evidence, the court granted the defendant's motion for a directed verdict on the ground that the evidence offered
26 Id. at 1067.
27 350 P.2d 810 (Colo. 1960).
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by plaintiff, considered in a light most favorable to her, failed to
establish notice to the defendant of the dangerous condition complained of, and failed to establish that she was an invitee upon the
premises. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded on the ground
that there was evidence upon all controlling questions, namely:
negligence of the defendant; notice to the defendant; whether the
plaintiff was an invitee or a licensee; and whether her own evidence established contributory negligence. The court then went on
to hold that the jury should have been permitted to draw their own
inferences from the evidence.
Noel v. Jones2 was another case of a business visitor's slipping
on ice on a land occupiers' premises. The jury returned a verdict
for the defendants. The plaintiff set out several errors he claimed
were made by the trial judge in giving instructions over plaintiff's
objections. One instruction required the plaintiff to establish in
support of his claim the element of the defendant's constructive
notice by "clear and definite" evidence. The Supreme Court held
this to be error because it was, in effect, a direction to the jury that
the matter must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt.
Gray v. Turner 29 was an action against four defendants, individually and doing business as partners under the name of the Colburn
Hotel, for injuries received by plaintiff when she fell on ice and
snow accumulated on defendants' driveway and sidewalk. Plaintiff
had fallen after visiting a resident of the hotel. At the conclusion
of the evidence offered on behalf of plaintiff, counsel for defendants
moved for a directed verdict. The motion was granted and judgment entered in favor of defendants. The Supreme Court reversed
and remanded. It reviewed the evidence and concluded that "there
was evidence 30 upon all controlling questions from which different
inferences might be drawn by men of integrity and intelligence."
The court then stated that under such circumstances the jury should
be permitted to draw their own inferences from the evidence.
Matt Skorey Packard Co. v. Canino"1 is a case that shows what
could happen to almost anyone owning a car. Plaintiff purchased
an automobile from the defendant, the sale including inspection,
greasing, and other services, until the car had been driven a certain
number of miles. On the occasion in question, the car not being in
operating order, the defendant towed the car to its garage for repair. When the plaintiff went to the garage for his car, he was told
that it was not ready but the manager of the garage told him to return that night when the car would be ready and that a salesman
would be there and would admit him through the salesroom adjoining the service department. This the plaintiff did. The salesman
took the plaintiff out into the service department, not bothering to
turn on the lights. There was a small light, neither bright nor dim,
hanging in the nearby parts department which shed light in the
service department, and some light came from outside through a
large rear window of the shop. The plaintiff looked down the lane
of cars, saw his car, and said, "That is my car." The salesman an28 350
29 350
30 The
31 350

P.2d 815 (Colo. 1960).
P.2d 1043 (Colo. 1960).
evidence is not set out in the opinion.
P.2d 1069 (Colo. 1960).
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swered, "Okay." The plaintiff walked forward in the semi-darkness
and fell into a pit over which his car rested. Trial was to the court,
resulting in judgment for the plaintiff. Defendant contended in the
Supreme Court, as it did in the trial court, that plaintiff was guilty
of contributory negligence as a matter of law. However, the Supreme Court affirmed for the plaintiff on the ground that there was
sufficient competent evidence to show that plaintiff was not guilty,
as a matter of law, of contributory negligence.
Price v. Central Assembly of God 2 involved the question
whether plaintiff, a woman sixty-seven years of age, a member of
the church and of its Women's Missionary group, was a licensee or
an invitee, when she was on the premises of the church, a religious
corporation, attending a regular monthly meeting of the missionary
group. The plaintiff was injured when she fell down a flight of
stairs at the end of an unlighted hallway. The trial court ruled that
plaintiff was a mere licensee and that the only duty of defendant
was to refrain from intentionally or wilfully injuring her. The Supreme Court reversed and ordered a new trial. It stated that Crosby
v. Kroeger33 was controlling, that plaintiff was an invitee, and that
it was for the jury to decide whether or not plaintiff was guilty of
contributory negligence.
Hook v. Lakeside Park Co. 34 involved injuries received by plaintiff, a young woman, while riding the Loop-O-Plane in defendant's
amusement park in Denver. It seems that the Loop-O-Plane is a device consisting of a cylindrical shaped car in which two passengers
sit back-to-back. The car is attached to a long arm which rotates in
a circle on a vertical plane in alternately clockwise and counterclockwise directions. When plaintiff got into the car, defendant's
attendant told plaintiff that she might bump her head. After boarding the car, plaintiff noticed a leather strap across her body below
her waist, but she did not feel any pressure from the strap when the
machine was not in motion. A metal cross bar extended across the

car in front of the passenger. Plaintiff took hold of this bar when
the machine started, but she was unable to retain her hold when
the car swung through a full circle. She was thrown violently forward so that her head touched the floor and then thrown back into
her seat. Examination showed that plaintiff suffered a compression
fracture of the first lumbar vertebra in the center of her back. The
trial was commenced before a jury, but at the close of plaintiff's
case, the court, on defendant's motion, ordered the complaint dismissed and entered judgment in favor of the defendant.
On writ of error, the plaintiff contended that an adequate case
was made before the trial court, either on the theory of simple
negligence or of res ipsa loquitur, to justify submission of the cause
to the jury. The Supreme Court, by a four to three decision, affirmed the judgment of dismissal. The court reasoned that it was
plaintiff's theory that if defendant's attendant had fastened the
safety strap tightly she would not have been injured, but there was
no evidence to show that the strap was designed to protect against
32 356 P.2d 240 (Colo. 1960).
33 138 Colo. 55, 330 P.2d 958 (1958).
34 351 P.2d 261 (Colo. 1960).
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the hazard of moving forward; since the strap was located across
the hips and down, it was logical to suppose that it was intended to
hold the occupant against the force of gravity when the car moved
into an upside down position and that the bar in front of the person
was the protective device against the kind of forward motion which
produced the compression fracture. The court concluded that if
negligence in not tightly fastening the strap had caused the plaintiff
to bump her head on the wire screening at the top of the car, thereby causing injury, she might recover, but since the strap was not
designed to keep her from going forward-which she
did because
35
she lost her grip on the bar-she could not recover.
Why the court assumes that the belt was intended only for the
one purpose of keeping a person from orbiting upward or downward is hard to understand. It seems more logical to assume that
the tighter the belt around the hips just below the waist the easier
it would be to hold on to the bar in front. The plaintiff had no control over the belt; it was supposed to be fastened from outside the
car by the defendant's attendant. Having assumed that the belt was
intended solely to keep a person from going straight up or down,
the court easily found that the negligence as to the loose strap
was
3 6
not a substantial factor in producing the plaintiff's injuries.
The next claim of plaintiff, that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur
applied, also met with disapproval. The court said the accident was
not of the kind which bespeaks negligence as it could have happened from nontortious conduct, and that it was possible that the
plaintiff's failure in holding onto the bar was the cause of her injury. The court gave one more reason for its position-the assumption of the risk by the plaintiff. In support thereof, it quoted from
perhaps the most famous opinion ever written in this field, that7 of
Mr. Justice Cardozo in Murphy v. Steeplechase Amusement Co.
35 It is humbly submitted that this raised a jury question. The plaintiff's evidence showed that
plaintiff was thrown so far forward that she bumped her head on the floor. Her testimony was not
contradicted. If the belt had been securely and tightly fastened, it would have been impossible for
her to bump her head on the floor.
36 Citing the Restatement, Torts, § 433, the court said: "Where as here, several events may have
brought about the harm to plaintiff, and an event other than the defendant's negligence appears
predominant, the alleged negligence cannot be considered a substantial factor."
Finally, the court observed: "Undoubtedly evidence was available which could have shed light on
the functions of the instrumentality in the present case on possible negligence of the defendant. For
reasons of her own, however, the plaintiff chose not to call the operator of the Loop-O-Plane or any
other witness who could enlighten the court concerning its functions." Are we to understand from this
that the plaintiff must prove her case through the testimony of defendant's employees who are likely
to be hostile witnesses?
3T 250 N.Y. 479, 166 N.E., 173, 174 (1929). In that case, however, the risk of injury was much
more apparent than that in the instant case-that is, if there was any apparent risk in the instant
case.

Experf
Brief Printers

go
THE THEd
en
AM 6-L77

e Commercial Printing
* Catalogues and Brochures
* Year Books - Magazines
- Book Binding
9Books
House Organs

ell PRESS

2400 CURTIS STREET

Denver, Colorado

DICTA

MARCH-APRIL,

1961

The dissenting opinion brought out in a forceful manner the objections that have been made above to the majority opinion, and
more. The minority felt that the jury should have been permitted
to decide all the questions
of fact, and it is submitted there were
8
some questions of fact
VIII. AUTOMOBILE GUEST STATUTE
During 1960, the Colorado Supreme Court, in several decisions,
has indicated its continuing liberal construction of the automobile
guest statute in favor of plaintiffs and against defendant automobile
drivers. This is, of course, consonant with its former declarations
that since the statute 9is in derogation of the common law, it must
be strictly construed
In Hodges v. Ladd,40 the question was whether the defendant
driver was guilty of driving in a negligent manner, consisting of a
wilful and wanton disregard of the rights of his guest when he continued to drive after becoming conscious that he was drowsy and
sleepy. The driver continued to drive at a speed of about fifty miles
an hour, fell asleep, crashed into a dirt fill on a ditch bank causing
the death of one of his passengers, the daughter of the plaintiffs.
The trial court directed a verdict for the defendant driver and another defendant who owned the car and had let his son use it on the
trip for a "family purpose." The Supreme Court, by a four to three
decision, reversed and remanded, saying, in part:
Ladd, up to the time he fell asleep, was doing exactly
what he intended to do. His conduct in driving was not the
result of an untoward or unanticipated event; his conduct
was wilful (defined by Webster as 'self-determined,' 'voluntary,' 'intentional'). Ladd's admitted drowsiness was his
premonitory symptom of impending sleep -a
warning
which he saw fit to intentionally and wilfully disregard, as
evidenced by his statement that he thought 'it was so close
to home that he could make it on home.' Ladd took the
needless chance of falling asleep while driving; he and all
drivers are chargeable with knowledge that driving while
asleep will probably lead to an accident. 41
The Hodges case makes new law. It will be interesting to follow the Supreme Court's future delineation of the effect of a driver's falling asleep at the wheel.
The case of Coffman v. Godsoe42 also makes new law. There the
action was for personal injuries received by the plaintiff, a girl of
high school age, while riding in an automobile operated by one of
the defendants, a boy sixteen years of age. The other defendants
were owners of the automobile and were the parents of the driver.
The plaintiffs' evidence was: that the defendant driver and plaintiff
were fellow high school students and close friends; that they had
spent a great deal of time together in the plaintiff's home; that defendant driver induced the plaintiff and another girl to ride with
38
:-9
40
41
42

That it was a four to three decision is evidence of that.
For instance,
see Green v. Jones, 136 Colo. 512, 516, 319 P.2d 1083, 1086 (1957).
2
352 P. d 660 (Colo. 1960).
Id. at 663.
351 P.2d 808 (Colo. 1960).
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him by making false representations that he had had a good deal of
experience driving a car in Wyoming, had a Wyoming driver's license, and had just obtained his Colorado driver's license that morning on reaching the age of sixteen. Plaintiff telephoned her mother
to get permission for the ride. The mother authorized plaintiff to
ride to a neighborhood soda fountain, but not to ride around. The
defendant started out for the agreed destination but did not go
there. Instead, he drove around the neighborhood, almost striking
a parked car when he took his hands off the steering wheel. While
they were driving, there was conversation concerning the driver's
license, and defendant again assured plaintiff that he did have the
license. Shortly thereafter, he entered Washington Park, and, while
driving past the tennis courts, took his eyes from the road, failed to
make a turn, drove on the grass and struck a light pole head on. As
a consequence, plaintiff suffered serious injuries, including the loss
of an eye.
At the conclusion of the plaintiff's evidence, the trial court
granted the defendant's motion for nonsuit on the ground that
there was no evidence of willful or wanton conduct and that the
guest statute applied and constituted a bar to recovery. The trial
judge expressed himself as being reluctant to hold that the guest
statute did not apply when counsel for neither side had been able
to find any case in this jurisdiction or elsewhere as to whether a
guest statute should not apply where the plaintiff becomes a passenger because of the deceit of the driver. The Supreme Court, by
a five to one decision, reversed and remanded.
The Supreme Court reasoned that the guest-host relation is a
consensual relationship in its nature and involves conscious acceptance by the guest of the status or relationship with its attendant
hazards. After pointing out that the court had previously held that
one does not stand in the guest relationship where he becomes a
passenger involuntarily or by the use of force or where he is too
young to accept the relationship, 43 the court went on to show that
where consent is obtained in cases of intentional torts, such as assault and battery, and false imprisonment, fraud of the defendant
vitiates such consent so that it may not be set up successfully as a
privilege or defense. The analogy of fraud in contract law and in
inducing the marriage relationship was also mentioned. The court
concluded that if the plaintiff's consent was obtained by fraud, she
did not become a guest as contemplated by the statute, and only
simple negligence on the part of defendant would have to be shown
for the plaintiff to recover. Since the defendant had not put in his
evidence at the trial, the case was remanded for further proceedings
to determine as a question of law or fact, depending on the circumstances, whether the plaintiff was induced to accept the guest status
because of the defendant's false and fraudulent statements.
The dissent reasoned that under the majority opinion, the question of the driver-guest relationship is reduced to one of fact for the
jury rather than a question of law for the court. It was maintained
that whether the passenger becomes a "guest" has always been a
question of law and that a host of actions would now be brought by
43 Green v. Jones, 136 Colo. 512, 319 P.2d 1083 (1957).
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persons who, under the guest statute, are unquestionably guests, but
each of whom will attempt to persuade a jury that he was induced
to become a passenger by 4the
false representations of the host that
4
he was a competent driver.
In Vogts v. Guerrette,45 the court held that the guest statute
does not violate the Colorado Constitution. The case involved a personal injury not resulting in death. Two justices dissented.
Taylor v. Welle 46 is interesting in that the plaintiff contended
that the wrongful death statute created a right of action independent of the guest statute and is not subject to the limitations imposed
by the latter statute. Plaintiff sued defendant for wrongfully causing the death of her husband, a guest in an automobile driven by
defendant. At the trial, a motion by the defendant to dismiss was
granted on the ground that the evidence adduced showed only simple negligence and not negligence consisting of a wilful and wanton
disregard of the rights of others as required under the guest statute.
The Supreme Court affirmed. It pointed out: that the wrongful
death statute was enacted in 1872, and it created a new cause of action which did not theretofore exist; that the guest statute was enacted in 1931, and it included besides a cause of action for damages
for "injury," a cause of action for damages for "death." The majority opinion concluded:
There being no recovery for death except under the
provisions of the Wrongful Death Statute, and the Guest
Statute specifically precluding recovery for death except
under the conditions therein specified, the Guest Statute
must be held to apply 47to and limit recovery under the
Wrongful Death Statute.
Justice Hall wrote an opinion, specially concurring. His position was that the guest statute is unconsititutional when invoked
against the guest for injuries not resulting in death. Justice Hall
stated: "My views on the question are amply and ably expressed in
the dissenting opinion of Justice Frantz in the case of Vogts v. Guerrette,' '4 but he went on to say that he believed the guest statute is
constitutional as applied to actions seeking recovery for wrongful
death.
Justice Frantz wrote a dissenting opinion in which he reiterated
49
his views expressed in his dissenting opinion in Vogts v. Guerrette
and stated that he would hold that the attempt of the legislature in
the guest statute to withdraw the remedy afforded for wrongful
death of an automobile guest caused by negligence, a nullity.
In Steeves v. Smiley,50 defendant, a boy 16 years of age, who
had obtained his driver's license on his sixteenth birthday two
months before, was driving at night, with his three passengers of
44 This case is discussed in a case comment in 46 Va. L. Rev. 1615 (Dec. 1960). Although the com.
mentator agrees with the low of the case as announced by the majoirty opinion, he remarks: "It
might be contended, however, that the legislative intent to prevent collusive low suits by the enactment of automobile guest statutes is weakened by the instant decision, since a driver could admit
with impunity that he had fraudulently induced plaintiff into his vehicle and thus render his insurance
company liable for his ordinary negligence."
45 351 P.2d 851 (1960).
46 352 P.2d 106 (Colo. 1960).
47 Id. at 109.
48 Supra note 45.
49 Ibid.
50 354 P.2d 1011 (Colo. 1960).
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about the same age, at an excessive speed when he turned to the
left and into the ditch on that side of the road. The three passengers
had warned defendant that he was driving too fast, but the defendant persisted in driving fast, in passing cars, and in weaving in and
out of traffic. The defendant's explanation to a patrolman as to why
he turned left into the ditch was that he believed that the vehicle
he was passing was about to make a left turn. Two of the passengers were seriously injured, one fatally, for which this action
was brought. The jury awarded damages for the wrongful death
of one passenger and for injuries to a second passenger. The trial
court granted the motions of defendant for directed verdicts. The
Supreme Court reversed the judgment and remanded the cause to
the trial court with directions to reinstate the verdict and enter
judgments thereon. The Supreme Court considered the evidence as
being sufficient to go to the jury on the question as to whether defendant's negligence consisted of a wilful and wanton disregard of
the rights of others. The court noted that the trial court's determination was rendered prior to the Hodges case 51 and also predated
Coffman v. Godsoe,5 2 Vogts v. Guerrette,53 and Taylor v. Welle.5 4
These cases appear above.
Baker v. Williams5 5 is another guest statute case in which the
defendant driver fell asleep. The defendant and the decedent went
on a fishing trip together. The testimony for the plaintiffs, suing
under the wrongful death statute, showed that defendant knew he
was getting sleepy, but that he kept on driving. The decedent was
asleep in the car. The defendant driver fell asleep; the car hit a soft
shoulder and a rock, turned over and threw the decedent and the
defendant into the river by the side of the road. Defendant was able
to scramble to safety, but the decedent drowned. In the trial court,
the cause went to the jury which found for the plaintiffs. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment below. It stated that the facts
in the case at bar, establishing wilful and wanton conduct, were
stronger than in the Hodges56 case. As to the claim of the defendant
that the decedent was contributorily negligent, the court stated that
the trial court acted properly in eliminating that question from the
consideration of the jury. Likewise it stated that the question of unavoidable accident was also properly eliminated as an issue in the
case.
IX. RELEASE OF JOINT TORT-FEASORS - COVENANTS NOT To SUE
Perhaps the case of Price v. Baker57 should not be commented on
in this article, because the Supreme Court's majority and dissenting
opinions were rendered in 1959,58 by a divided court of four to three.
51 Hodges v. Ladd, 352 P.2d 660 (Colo. 1960).
52351 P.2d 808 (Colo. 1960).
53 351 P.2d 851 (Colo. 1960).
54 352 P.2d 106 (Colo. 1960).
55 Baker v. Williams, 357 P.2d 61 (Colo. 1960).
56 Supro note 51.

57 352 P.2d 90 (Colo. 1960).
5S 12 Colo. Bar Ass'n. Adv. Sh. 157 (1959).
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However, the court's decision does not appear in the Pacific or Colorado reports for 1959. Upon rehearing in 1960, the court unfortunately adhered to its original opinion of 1959. The question involved
was wiether an agreement intended as a covenant not to sue one
joint tort-feasor, but unintentionally amounting to a release of that
tort-feasor, should be a complete release of the remaining joint tortfeasors. The Supreme Court held that the agreement released all
the joint tort-feasors. The decision was soundly criticized last year
in DICTA by two different writers. 59 One may sympathize with the
position of Justice Moore who concurred in the decision only because of a prior holding of the court in 1956.60
In Hamm v. Thompson,6' plaintiffs sued defendant driver and
the driver's employer for damages arising out of an automobile accident. The trial court ordered that the action be dismissed as to
the employer pursuant to a "Stipulation for Dismissal" filed by
plaintiffs and the driver's employer. On the same day, plaintiffs
executed and delivered to the employer, in consideration of $750, a
document entitled "Covenant Not to Sue." Thereafter the defendant
driver moved to dismiss the complaint on the grounds: that the
"Covenant Not to Sue" was a release of the employer; that defendant driver and defendant employer were joint tort-feasors; and that
a release of one joint tort-feasor is a release of all. The trial court
denied defendant driver's motion, and subsequently a verdict was
returned for plaintiffs and judgment was entered thereon. The Supreme Court affirmed. The question involved had never been decided in Colorado. The court reasoned that the master is held
vicariously liable for the tort of his servant under the doctrine of
respondent superior, but the master in such a case is not a true joint
tort-feasor although the master 'and servant may be joined as defendants in one action. Accordingly, the plaintiff's release of the
master for the tortious act of the servant should not release the
servant who was the active wrongdoer. The court pointed out that
if there had been no release, which the court interpreted this socalled "covenant not to sue" to be, and if the plaintiff had recovered
judgment against the master, the master would have had a right
of indemnity against the servant. The court did not point to many
cases to support its conclusion, 62 but it seems that its reasoning is
imminently sound on principles of tort and master-servant law.
X.

MALICIOUS PROSECUTION

In Lowen v. Hilton,63 the plaintiff sued his brother and a doctor, who was a psychiatrist, for malicious prosecution. He alleged:
that the psychiatrist sent a letter to the judge of the county court
requesting that a "Hold and Treat Order" be entered authorizing
the confinement of plaintiff in a sanitarium; that his brother signed
the verified petition upon which the county court issued the order
59 Goldsmith, One Year Review of Contracts, 37 DICTA 1, 5 (1960); Cocovinis, Release of One Joint
Tort-Feasor Is a Release of All, 37 DICTA 21, (1960). A recent annotation on the subject is Release
of One Joint Tort-feasor as Discharging Liability of Others: Modern Trends, 73 A.L.R. 2d 403 (1960).
That annotation indicates that Colorado is one of the few jurisdictions that has not joined in the
modern trend on this very important point of tort law and contract low. Perhaps legistlation is needed
to modernize the Colorado rule and put us where we belong.
60 Morris v. Diers, 134 Colo. 39, 298 P.2d 957 (1956).
61 353 P.2d 73 (Colo. 1960).
62 There is little authority on the subject.
63 351 P.2d 881 (Colo. 1960).
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resulting in plaintiff's confinement; that such petition contained the
allegation that plaintiff had a "thinking disorder, paranoid in nature"; that plaintiff was confined for about a week; that the county
court discharged him from custody, finding that he was not insane.
The defendants filed separate motions to dismiss plaintiff's complaint, each of which was granted by the trial court. The trial court
took the view that a section of the statute relating to the commitment of insane persons 64 protected the defendants. The section
reads, in part, as follows: "....

[The order of the county court to hold

and treat plaintiff I shall be a complete protection for the confinement, examination, observation and treatment of such patient as
against all persons." The Supreme Court reversed and remanded.
It interpreted the statute as protecting those persons who act after
the issuance of the confinement order, and not persons who act before the issuance of such order. The court said any other interpretation of the statute might render it unconstitutional.
XI.

CLAIMS AGAINST

CITY, COUNTY, STATE

A. Filing Claim Against City
Dowell v. Schisler65 involved the city of Denver and a tort
claimant, who gave the required 60-day notice, stating as required
"when, where and how the injuries occurred and the extent thereof."6 6 The question raised was whether plaintiff could successfully
claim more for personal injury and property damages in his complaint than specified in his notice to the mayor of the city. Some
months after filing his 60-day notice, plaintiff allegedly found his
physical injuries to be serious, and in his complaint he alleged these
extra damages. During the pre-trial conference the trial court granted the defendant's motion to strike from plaintiff's complaint all
allegations of damages and injuries not specifically shown in the
notice of claim. The trial court seemingly took the restricted view
that the charter provision was intended to prevent anybody from
recovering for injuries who had not known, within 60-days of his
injuries, how serious they might ultimately be. The Supreme
Court, by a majority of four to three, held for the plaintiff, pointing out that it was in essence only fair to let plaintiff try to recover
for damages that were not known to him before the 60 days expired.
64 Colo. Rev. Stat. § 71-1-3 (3) (1953).
65 354 P.2d 1952.
66 Denver, Colorado, Charter art. VIII, § 158.
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The dissenting opinion, it appears, is not too logical. It seems
to be based on the fact that the plaintiff gave notice of a claim within the 60 days for only $347.84, alleging a medical bill for X-rays,
a doctor's bill and seven days' loss of work, but then filed a complaint claiming damages of $50,000 for alleged personal injuries.
The majority opinion appears logical and proper. A plaintiff who
has filed his notice within the 60 day period has fulfilled the purpose of the charter provision. The city has been notified of the
claim against it and may take the necessary investigative steps.
The claimant has not been denied relief for any damage discovered
subsequent to the filing of his claim.
B. Charitable Immunity
The case of Michard v. Myron Stratton Home67 serves to clarify
somewhat the "immunity" of charities for the torts of their agents.
A claim of plaintiff against the defendant, a charitable corporation,
sounded in tort. The trial court dismissed the plaintiff's complaint
on this claim because the defendant was a charitable .corporation
and upon the admission in the trial court that there was no noncorporate asset such as insurance coverage to satisfy a judgment.
The Supreme Court held the dismissal to be error. The court pointed out that it had long recognized that the doctrine of charitable
immunity, if it can be called "immunity," is highly restricted. Charitable immunity, said the court, does not prevent the entry of judgment against a charitable corporation. The court concluded that socalled charitable immunity does not protect from suit or judgment
and that immunity from attachment of the charitable trust funds
does not come into play until such attachment is attempted. Whether there are funds available to satisfy a judgment, if and when it
is entered, is a question which the trial court was not called upon
to anticipate in considering the motion to dismiss.
C. Immunity of City
In City and County of Denver v. Madison,68 the plaintiff, a sixmonths-old child, was admitted as a patient to Denver General Hospital, which is operated by the City and County of Denver. While
being treated by the use of a steam vaporizer, the plaintiff was seriously scalded. Upon plaintiff's bringing action against the city for
damages, the defendant filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that
the hospital and its employees were engaged in a governmental
function, and, therefore, as a matter of law, the city could not be
held liable. The motion to dismiss was overruled, and the city answered, setting up as a separate defense the immunity of the city
because its employees were performing services in connection with
a governmental function of the city. The trial resulted in a verdict
for plaintiff for $35,000. The Supreme Court, by a four to three
decision, reversed and remanded with directions to dismiss the action. The majority opinion discussed the law established by a long
line of Colorado cases holding that, although a city may be held
liable for the tortious acts of its officers, agents or employees com67 355 P.2d 1078 (Colo. 1960).
68 351 P.2d 826 (Colo. 1960).
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mitted by them in the discharge of functions or duties relating to
the proprietary or private corporate purposes of the city, a city may
not be held liable for tortious acts committed in the discharge of
functions or duties which are governmental in nature and which
are "exercised in virtue of certain attributes of sovereignty delegated to it for the welfare and protection of its inhabitants." The
court acknowledged, however, that beginning with Ace Flying Serv.
Inc. v. Colorado Dep't of Agriculture, 9 it had consistently repudiated the doctrine of sovereign immunity from suit in actions sounding in contract.
A vigorous dissent was written by Justice Frantz, concurred in
by Justice Hall, and an equally vigorous dissent was written by
Justice Doyle. Justice Doyle ends his dissenting70opinion by quoting
from an annotation in American Law Reports as follows: "The
shocking effect of the immunity doctrine is well illustrated by the
fact that, in the view of some courts, no immunity attaches where
property rights are violated by governmental action, but does attach
where it is merely a matter of the life or limb of a human being."
D. Immunity of County For Torts
In Liber v. Flor,71 plaintiff brought action against three defendants individually, who were the county commissioners, and against
the board of county commissioners of Ouray county to recover damages for the alleged tortious acts of defendants in storing dangerous
explosives near a highway in a manner constituting an ultrahazardous activity. The trial court ordered dismissal of the action and entered judgment for the defendants. The Supreme Court, by a four
to three decision, decided that the trial court committed no error in
dismissing the action as to the county, because, although each organized county of the state is by statute72 a body corporate and may
sue and be sued, a county is not liable for the tortious acts of its
servants in performing duties in furtherance of a governmental
function, as distinguished from a proprietary function. The court
decided, however, that the trial court erred in dismissing the action
as against the defendants individually, as they might be held liable
if they were found to be the actual tort-feasors or if they were found
to be negligent in supervising acts of subordinates or had directed
or authorized the wrong. Vigorous separate dissenting opinions
were written by Justices Hall, Frantz, and Doyle.
M. & M. Oil Transp., Inc. v. Board of County Comm'rs73 followed this case and likewise held that a county is not liable for its
torts committed while carrying out its governmental functions.
E. Immunity of State
In Faber v. State, plaintiffs brought action against the state
and the state department of highways to recover damages for alleged tortious acts. The attorney general, on behalf of defendants,
74

69 136 Colo. 79, 314 P.2d 278 (1957).
70 25 A.L.R.2d 205, 210 (1952).
71 353 P.2d 590 (Colo. 1960).
72 Colo. Rev. Stot. § 36-1-1 (1953).
73 353 P.2d 613 (Colo. 1960).
74 353 P.2d 609 (Colo. 1960).
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filed a motion to dismiss the action on the ground that they were
immune from liability in tort. The trial court sustained the motion
and dismissed the action. The Supreme Court affirmed by a five to
two decision. The court pointed out that in Colorado and generally
throughout the country, it has been uniformly held that in the absence of a statute creating such liability, the state and its instrumentalities are not liable in tort.
This decision was followed in Berger
75
v. Department of Highways.
XII.

CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE

6
An important case is Chartier v. Winslow Crane Serv. Co.,'
which raised and decided important questions in the law of torts,
procedure, and master and servant. The plaintiff, a steelworker,
was employed by a building contractor that was building a fivestory building in Denver. The contractor had a contract with the
Weicker Company which agreed to perform certain services and to
furnish certain equipment. The Weicker Company, in turn, subcontracted with the defendant crane service company for the latter
to furnish a crane, with an operator, to assist in the building contractor's erection of the building. In carrying on the work, the operator of the defendant's crane, in operating the crane, was supposed to be guided by hand signals of the foreman employed by the
plaintiff's employer. On such an occasion, while the plaintiff was
working on the second floor of the more or less skeletal building,
the foreman gave a hand signal to the defendant crane service company's operator, and the operator, in responding, acted negligently
in the operation of the crane. About the same time, the foreman
yelled to the plaintiff to come help him, and the responding plaintiff, taking a short cut, stepped on a concrete slab which fell, because of the negligence of the crane operator in continuing to put
pressure on a vertical steel beam, taking the plaintiff to the ground
where he was seriously injured. There was evidence that the foreman was negligent in failing to signal the crane operator to ease up
on the pressure. The case went to the jury, which awarded plaintiff
a verdict of $50,531. The trial court set the verdict aside and granted defendant's motion for a new trial.
The trial judge rested his grant of defendant's motion for a new
trial on five grounds: (1) that the verdict was excessive, (2) that
the verdict was not warranted by the evidence, (3) that the verdict
was against the substantial weight of the evidence, (4) that the
court erred in giving an instruction relating to action taken in the
face of an emergency, and (5) that the court erred in refusing to
give defendant's requested instruction relating to the general elements of a negligence action. On writ of error, the Supreme Court
reversed for the plaintiff and remanded with directions to reinstate
the verdict and to enter judgment thereon. The Supreme Court
stated that the jury could find, as it did, that the plaintiff neither
75 353 P.2d 612 (Colo. 1960).
76 350 P.2d 1044 (Colo. 1960).
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assumed the risk nor was guilty of contributory negligence, because
the route that plaintiff took to come over to help his employer's
foreman was only slightly more hazardous, if at all, than a safer
route that the defendant claimed the plaintiff should have taken.
The court pointed out, citing many Colorado cases, that the question
of contributory negligence is one for the jury where the facts are
disputed and where reasonable minds could reach different conclusions. The court next held that the defendant's crane operator was
not a loaned servant under the control of the building contractor so
as to exculpate the defendant from the tort of its crane operator.
The court agreed with the plaintiff's view that the crane operator
was the servant of the defendant crane service, as the jury below
had found.
Next, the Supreme Court had to pass on whether the jury's verdict of damages to the plaintiff for $50,531 was excessive. The court
held it was not. It took into consideration that plaintiff was seriously incapacitated by defendant's negligence, that he was but 37 years
of age, that he had a life expectancy of over 31 years, and that his
annual income during the three years preceding the injury averaged $8,200.
The Supreme Court also considered the effect of the Workmen's
Compensation Act. The defendant contended that plaintiff had no
action against it because he had a remedy against his own employer
under the act. The Colorado Industrial Commission appeared as a
plaintiff in the suit below by virtue of its having paid $643.50 in
temporary total disability payments on behalf of the plaintiff steelworker's employer, the construction company. The defendant maintained that the plaintiff steelworker, having received benefits by
virtue of a section of the act, 77 surrendered all common law remedies. The Supreme Court construed the section in question as applying only to remedies against the immediate employer and not as
operating to relieve a third person, such as the defendant, from
liability.
In Tucker v. Dixon, 78 an 11-year-old girl, a paying guest, was
injured in defendants' motel swimming pool. After diving into the
pool, she surfaced and struck her mouth on an object floating in the
water. Two of her front teeth were broken. The object was a heavy
plastic float, part of the vacuum cleaning equipment used by defendants in cleaning the pool. The floats were ordinarily attached
to the vacuum hose by a cord, but they could be easily removed,
and on several occasions they had been removed by children and
had been found later floating in the pool. When plaintiff went for
her swim, she observed three boys in the shallow end of the pool
playing with an object, which they were throwing back and forth.
A short time later, the boys left the pool, leaving the object in the
water. The trial was to the court without a jury. The trial court
found that the defendants were negligent in leaving the cleaning
equipment near the pool where it could be tampered with as it had
been before; that the defendants' negligence was the sole and proximate cause of the young girl's injuries; and that plaintiff was not
77 Colo. Rev. Stat. § 81-4-4 (1953).
78 355 P.2d 79 (Colo. 1960).
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guilty of contributory negligence. The Supreme Court, by a per
curiam opinion, affirmed. The court approved the finding of the
trial court below of the defendants' knowledge of the risk and of
the young girl's lack of knowledge thereof.
In Jasper v. City and County of Denver,79 the plaintiff, a 64year-old woman, preparatory to crossing a street, stepped off the
curb into a hole in the crosswalk and fell. The plaintiff had used
this crosswalk several times before while it was in such hazardous
condition. On this occasion, plaintiff was concentrating on crossing
the street to take a bus. The jury returned a verdict for plaintiff.
The trial court set aside the verdict and dismissed plaintiff's complaint on the ground, among others, that plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment and remanded with directions to reinstate the
verdict and enter judgment for plaintiff. The court pointed out that
notwithstanding plaintiff's knowledge of a danger, justifiable
distraction or forgetfulness may excuse a party injured thereby.80
The case of La Garde v. Aeverman l presents a somewhat unusual fact situation in that both the defendant truck driver and the
plaintiff pedestrian were guilty of negligence per se. The truck
driver's negligence consisted of violating a section of the Denver
Municipal Code, which provides that the driver emerging from an
alley shall only turn his vehicle to the right, unless the street is a
one-way street on which traffic is required to proceed in the opposite direction. 82 The plaintiff's contributory negligence consisted
in violating a Denver ordinance that prohibited pedestrians from
crossing a roadway other than in a crosswalk upon any through
street.8 3 While walking across a two-way through street, but not in
the crosswalk, plaintiff was struck and injured by the defendant
driver's truck, which after emerging from an alley, made a left turn
near the center of the street. The jury returned a verdict for plaintiff, but, on motion of the defendant for judgment notwithstanding
the verdict, the trial court entered judgment in favor of defendant.
The Supreme Court affirmed, pointing out that plaintiff's contributory negligence in violating an ordinance intended to protect her
from harm would deny her from recovering.
Denver and Rio Grande W. R.R. v. Duff 8

4

raises several in-

teresting points of law. It is rather complicated on its facts, made
even more so because the trial judge, without a jury, apparently did
not feel too certain about the facts developed on conflicting testimony. Plaintiff and his automobile were damaged at a grade crossing of defendant's railroad company by defendant's train proceeding southward out of Denver at a speed of 60 miles an hour where
Hampden Avenue crosses the tracks in Englewood, Colorado. Also
joined as defendant was the defendant railroad company's engineer
who was operating the train. At this crossing, there are three sets
of tracks, the easternmost for northbound through trains, the mid79 354 P.2d 1028 (Colo. 1960).
80 See a recent annotation entitled "Momentary Forgetfulness of Danger as Contributory Negligence" 74 A.L.R.2d 950 (1960). Several Colorado cases ore mentioned therein.
81 356 P.2d 971 (Colo. 1960).
82 Denver, Colorado, Revised Municipal Code 515.6-3 (1951).
83 Denver, Colorado, Revised Municipal Code § 521.7.2 (1951).
84 358 P.2d 456 (Colo. 1960).
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dle for a spur or industry track, and the westernmost for southbound through trains. Safety devices at this crossing consist of
flashing red lights and bells, activated by a train approaching approximately 30 seconds away from the crossing. The plaintiff, thoroughly familiar with the crossing, approached from the east at a very
moderate speed, and was 12 feet east of the most westerly track,
almost in the middle of the three sets of tracks, when the lights and
bells were activated by the train 2,711 feet to the north and over 30
seconds in time from the crossing. The visibility to the north to the
train was unobscured to one in plaintiff's position. Nevertheless, he
crossed the most westerly track and was two to six feet to the west
thereof, where his further progress was blocked by a pickup truck
driven by one Rex standing in the traffic lane ahead of him. Rex
had stopped as he reached Santa Fe Drive because of a red traffic
light. Plaintiff honkedhis horn and waved to Rex to move, but Rex
did not as he was too near the traffic on Santa Fe Drive. Apparently, though the evidence conflicted on this point, the plaintiff and
his car were in a position of safety at this point, because he was
sufficiently far enough west to be clear of the track and the overhang of the oncoming train. A few seconds before the train reached
the crossing, the plaintiff backed up, and in a few feet his car
stalled. The plaintiff jumped out, but not in time to avoid his
own automobile, thrown against him by the impact of the train.
Seemingly, the plaintiff intended to back up sufficiently to get clear
of Rex's truck so that he could drive forward into another traffic
lane. The trial court found for the plaintiff. It concluded that the
train, in approaching the crossing at a speed of 60 miles an hour
was guilty of negligence as a matter of law and that such negligent
conduct was the proximate cause of the collision.
The Supreme Court reversed and remanded with directions to
dismiss the complaint. Justice Doyle dissented. The gist of the majority opinion is that the defendant railroad company was not necessarily negligent; but assuming that it was, the plaintiff in crossing the tracks against the warning signals was guilty of negligence
as a matter of law and in "knowingly backing his car into the path
of the approaching train, he was guilty of further negligence as a
matter of law."
The better reasoning would seem to support Justice Doyle in
his dissenting opinion. He reasoned that the railroad company was
guilty of negligence in running its train at 60 miles an hour in a
highly urbanized section, and that plaintiff, although familiar with
the crossing, was confronted with an unexpected emergency situation which should have brought into play the emergency doctrine.
CONCLUSION

The Colorado Supreme Court decided an impressive volume of
cases during this past year. Although this article has been critical
of the court's decisions in some instances, the'court is to be commended for the fine job they have done in meeting and dealing with
the many controversial present-day issues before them.

Now... at Denver U.S. National

DEPOSIT ANY DAY

WITHDRAW ANY DAY
Earn Full Interest
for Every Dollar, Every Day!
A Denver U.S. National Savings Account is the ideal
depository for short-term funds because they begin
earning interest the day of deposit-yet are instantly
available without loss of interest-as long as the account remains open to the end of the quarter. What's
more, you can deposit, withdraw, and transfer funds
entirely by mail-with postage paid both ways.

'that's the -ank for fny

money!/

DENVER U.S.
NATIONAL
DENVER

U.S. NATIONAL

CENTER

- 17th and Broadway

Member Federal Desosit Insurance Corooration

